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There have been many occasions in my experience when the explanatory techniques normally
used by social historians have seemed inadequate to deal with some particular process or
event. No doubt this happens to every historian, but I sometimes suspect that the social world
of British colonialism in nineteenth century South Africa - my particular interest - provides
these moments more often than some other areas. This feeling is, no doubt, largely the result
of not knowing as much about the peculiarities of other places and times, but I do think it is at
least arguable that colonial encounters created more extraordinarily odd situations than many
other social environments. In past work, 1 have taken two approaches to these kinds of
explanatory challenges. In the case of really bizarre material, I have simply avoided discussing
it in writing and have rationalised my omissions on the grounds that this sort of thing is too
atypical to be helpful in building up a broad general picture of British settlers' attitudes and
experiences. In the case of more frequently occurring oddities, I have attempted to argue that
they were the result of the construction of settlers' attitudes by the prevalent discourses
concerning class identity and colonialism, which combined to create so great a social distance
between settlers and African people that what would otherwise have seemed socially
impossible became everyday and natural.1 Although I do, in general, stand by this analysis, I
have increasingly come to feel that it needs to be supplemented. Firstly, really peculiar
circumstances deserve some time in the historical spotlight by way of an adjunct to those
which an historian has decided were 'normal'. Extreme cases can be very useful in revealing
the limits of the normal. Secondly, explaining even the 'normal' seems to me to require the use
of psychological terms and techniques, however much historians may wish that this weren't
the case.
To begin with an oddity: Consider a passage from the reminiscences of Edward Wilson, a
Sub-Inspector in the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police in the 1860s. Wilson describes
arresting for pass offences two men whom he happened to encounter as he rode through the
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Katberg on his way from Grahamstown to Queenstown, and who were later convicted of
horse-theft. He then devotes a paragraph to a mediation upon the character of Africans as he
perceived them:
... they not unfrequently [sic] drive the stolen horses and cattle through the towns and
villages in broad daylight. Their amount of nerve is by no means deficient.,.. They are not
easily pleased with the quality of their meat. They place but very little value on a lean ox or
sheep. I have known them to quit good service, because they could not get fat meat and milk,
ad libitum. They are a much pampered, well fed race, with no small amount of insolence and
overbearing in their nature, and without regard for honesty. Thieving seems to be an innate
principle of their nature.2
Immediately following this Wilson describes an apparently unrelated incident, connected to the
first only in that both occurred in the Katberg:
I will mention here an incident which occurred on one occasion on my returning over the
Katberg to Grahamstown... I spotted a fine, noble tiger...The cool, independent - nay,
defiant strut of the tiger, galled me not a little: he walked leisurely, neither looking to the
right or left. It was too much for my nature. I levelled my revolver at him... and fired.... He
probably escaped scatheless.3
Edward Wilson, as his reminiscences make abundantly clear, was a somewhat unusual person;
possessed of a racism brutal and extreme even by the demanding standards of the Eastern
Cape in the 1860s, gloatingly mean-spirited, suspicious, greasily obsequious to his superiors
and painfully obsessed with the question of what a 'gentleman' was and whether he might
qualify to be one. Perhaps most remarkable of all, he was prepared to reveal - or was, perhaps,
incapable of concealing - all of this in an extensive published memoir. His reaction to the
'tiger' (leopard) he had seen, then, can hardly be taken as revealing a great deal about the
mainstream of settler culture. Before returning, at the end of this paper, to what it might mean
nevertheless, I would like to put it to another use: Note how difficult this incident is to
explain in historians' standard terms. A hypothetical Marxist, in the unlikely event that he or
she should consider the incident worth comment at all, might argue that Wilson shot at the
tiger as a result of his class anxieties: Wilson saw the tiger as a symbol of bourgeois status -
desirable, unattainable, maddening. However, the Marxist cannot establish a clear link between
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Wilson's social insecurity and his perception that a particular animal embodied the
characteristics that upset him. Why did Wilson notice the tiger at all? Why did he not instead
take a pot-shot at, say, a fat dog belonging to some irksome member of the Grahamstown
mercantile class? A discursive historian might have a somewhat easier time. He or she could
show, for instance, that an important part of the discourse of colonial masculinity was the
enjoyment of'mastery' over nature in the form of hunting,4 but would be as hard-pressed as
the admittedly straw-man Marxist to explain why Wilson had seen this particular animal as an
affront to his masculinity and had, what is more, admitted in writing that he was unable to
harm it.
Whatever lessons it might ultimately be possible to draw from Wilson's encounter with the
tiger, it remains the case that he was an oddity. More important than understanding Wilson's
and analogous situations, I would argue, is trying to analyse the 'normal oddities' which
characterised nineteenth century British settler culture in South Africa. These might be called
settlers' characteristic 'sleights of mind'. These sleights of mind included, for instance, the
familiar assertion by British settlers in South Africa that they had created 'an English home' in
defiance of all local material and social conditions, their self-perception as 'alone* when
surrounded by Africans on whom they relied in every conceivable way and the sense of
superiority which settlers appear to have retained even in their interactions with African
people who had considerable power over them - kings and chiefs, certainly, but also
customers, or neighbours with skills to share or teach or, say, oxen to lend.5 A similar process
appears to have operated in relation to settler-African friendship and sexuality, where equal
friendships and sexual relations (both oppressive and consensual) are known to have existed,
but which were almost always impossible for settlers to write - and therefore, perhaps, to think
about - clearly.
4
 See, for instance, J MacKenzie 'The imperial pioneer and hunter and the British masculine
stereotype in late Victorian and Edwardian times,' in J Mangan & J Walvin (eds) Manliness and morality.
Middle-class masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940, Manchester, 1987
5
 For multiple examples of all of these, see Dagut, opp. cit.
3
It could simply have been the case that settlers were, by and large, self-consciously cynical
hypocrites. This, however, is most unlikely. People, it seems fair to say, tend to preserve a
positive and integrated self-image. Very few of us - apart, perhaps, from certain regional
politicians - will consciously admit to ourselves that, lI habitually lie and strike false poses in
pursuit of my narrow personal interests.1 It is also possible to argue (as I have done in the
past) that settlers were so thoroughly cocooned and blinded by the discourse (or ideology) of
colonialism that they were completely unable to perceive major features of their social world.
This, again, is unlikely. While one may be largely 'constituted in discourse' one cannot
successfully constitute everything else in the terms of one's own discourse. Social perceptions
and attitudes do, as it happens, change under pressure from material and other forces.
Furthermore, individual minds change with personal experience and not only with changes in
the impersonal discourse in terms of which they are, nevertheless, largely constituted. For
these reasons, the explanation of settler 'sleights of mind', cannot, I now believe, be carried
out entirely in historians' standard material and discursive terms. While the use of material and
discourse analysis remain indispensable, they are, in these cases, neither sufficient nor
exhaustive.
Here are just two examples of the best known variety of these sleights of mind, the sense of
'being alone.' They are drawn from the writing of people who were as different as it was
possible to be and still be considered a British settler in South Africa: Charlotte Bousfield, an
embodied definition of British colonial respectability in her capacity as wife of the first
Anglican Bishop of Pretoria and Louis Cohen, a working-class Jewish East-ender who
prospered as a shady Kimberley diamond dealer. In the diary which Charlotte Bousfield kept
during the siege of Pretoria, she remarked on a day during which she had been able to visit her
house in the town before returning to the safety of the army camp at night. She enjoyed her
visit home, an escape from the noise, crowding and incessant demands of life in the camp; 'I
had a delightful day at home yesterday (Thursday) spending the mng. hours alone with one of
the kaffirs (Fat Boy) helping me to prepare & cook the dinner.'6 Cohen had a very similar
sense of the social invisibility of Africans in a very different context. Visiting a friend down on
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his luck in the Kimberley of the 1870s, he recalled that 'He looked quite lonely and lost, as
fever-eyed he lay in an untidy bed and cheerless, neglected room, with no companion but a
strong-smelling nigger, a consumptive candle, and a half-filled bottle of his curse and
consolation - a pint of champagne....'7
What Bousfield and Cohen shared, and also had in common with most other British settlers,
was a sense of the social invisibility of Africans in the context of domestic service - even fairly
intimate domestic service. It is worth repeating that the standard forms of explanation are
indispensable to understanding why this was the case. One could hardly expect a respectable
upper-middle-class English lady, surrounded by servants all her life at 'Home' not to be
capable of blocking her social perception of someone so culturally distant from her as 'Fat
Boy* Equally, Louis Cohen, whose predominant experience of Africans was in the form of the
mass of systematically dehumanised, apparently interchangeable and effectively rightless
workers at the diamond mines, also had good material and discursive reasons to regard an
individual African person as a feature, along with candles and champagne, of someone's
'loneliness'. What these forms of explanation do not provide, though, are an analysis of how
this invisibility was psychologically possible, where its limits lay, and how they are to be
detected. It is not, after all, as if Cohen and Bousfield were unaware of the presence of African
people in these situations. Rather, in this context, Africans seem to have existed for settlers in
what one might call a perceptual twilight - a twilight that could turn and, indeed, given the
reality of social change, must have turned, under certain circumstances, into a dawn of full
awareness or a night of complete 'social death'. In other words, Freudian repression, or
something very like it, was at work.
But this is dangerous talk. The importation of psychological terms into explanation is not a
respectable move within the discipline of history in general, and certainly not in South African
historiography. There are good reasons for this. What I would like to suggest, in the process
of surveying these reasons, is that psychological explanation is, nevertheless, unavoidable -
and that once its disreputable ancestors have been exorcised and its strengths and weaknesses
' L Cohen, Reminiscences of Kimberley. London, 1911. 176
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properly understood, it could become a very useful tool for historians concerned to understand
certain features of the social world.
The track record of psychological historiography, in sharp contrast to those of materialist or
discourse analysis, has not been encouraging. Undoubtedly the most distinguished of
psychologically inclined historians, Peter Gay (who has trained as a Freudian psychoanalyst),
is quick to concede that many practitioners of 'psychohistory' have given this approach a bad
name by their 'unwarranted reductions and extravagant speculations'.8 They have aimed both
too high and too low. Their aim has been too high in the sense that they have tried to reduce
historical explanation to what might be called vulgar Freudianism. In this attempt to establish
the determining role of psychological causes, 'psychohistorians' have adopted 'a deliberately
primitive id psychology... [which] demotes adult historical actors to bundles of persistent,
unresolved childhood symptoms'.9 Psychological historians have aimed too low where they
have concentrated on the explanation of what they have defined in advance as instances of
'collective psychosis' or on the 'psychobiography' of eminent or notorious individuals.10 The
first of these techniques is, of course, extremely vulnerable to the charge that it consists of
little more than self-fulfilling prophecy. The second is so narrowly focussed on a particular
person's character - understood in Freudian terms or some variant thereof- that it is unlikely
to be of great interest or use to historians with broader social and political concerns.
If the warmest praise that Peter Gay can summon up for European and American
psychohistorical writing since the 1950s is that while there have been a number of'fiascos',
there have also been occasional successes in the genre and, therefore, that the picture in
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general is lby no means wholly depressing*", it is not to be expected that more sceptical
historians will find compelling models to follow among the attempts which have been made to
understand colonial societies in psychological terms.
This is not to deny the broader importance of some of these attempts. Franz Fanon's Black
Skin, White Masks and Albert Memmi's The Colonizer and the Colonized are clearly among
the most important anti-colonial polemics of the twentieth century. Both offer enlightening
journalistic - in the best sense of the term - tours of French colonial culture's house of
mirrors.12 Both works contain a number of observations well worth the attention of historians
of colonial South Africa,13 but they also indulge in passages of precisely the sort of
1
 extravagant speculation' which Gay, as an empirical historian and as an orthodox Freudian,
would deplore: Memmi does so, for example, in his concoction of a 'Nero complex' from
which all (or almost all) colonisers suffered.14 Fanon makes an equivalent error in his
insistence that the 'Negro is a [sexually] phobogenic object' in the racist collective
unconscious shared by white French people.15 From historians' point of view, a more serious
difficulty, perhaps, is that these texts now read rather more as documentary sources on their
periods than as guides to method. Memmi's and Fanon's books were provided with
introductions by Jean Paul Sartre and are heavily influenced by existentialist conceptions of
individuality and freedom. Existentialism dates this work, and the psychological world which
they analyse seems, given 50 years of historical perspective, very precisely dated too. Much of
the psychological infrastructure which, they argue, sustains colonialism in general now appears
" Gay, 184
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very specific to French colonialism in its next-to-last phase. What Memmi and Fanon offer, in
other words, is description of some psychological corollaries of a particular social form rather
than examples of the use of a psychological scheme of explanation for social forms and
processes in general.
South African attempts to explain aspects of our special type of colonialism in psychological
terms have been no more likely to attract the approval of historians. As the social psychologist
Don Foster puts it, South African psychologists' attempts to understand South Africa's racial
order have tended to see 'racism [as]... generated in individual's minds and not in practices of
state or in service of economic advantages'.16 Two examples drawn from the work of South
African psychologists illustrate the point: Historians are extremely familiar with the
unacceptably ahistorical nature of the pioneering social psychologist I.D. MacCrone's
explanation of white racism as an atavism persisting, largely unchanged, from the 18th century
frontier.17 Chabani Manganyi's discussion of possible links between infant development and
racism seems to combine 'vulgar Freudianism' with a use of psychology - in the Fanon-
Memmi manner - as a method of describing consequences of existing social circumstances
rather than contributing to their explanation: 'What we know today about child development
enables us to conclude that, in the present cultural climate in Western societies, the child's
world view is decided in its fundamental form during the experience and resolution of the anal
crisis'.18 For Manganyi, white South African infants solve the problem of self-hate generated
by their simultaneous identification with and repulsion from their faeces by projecting the
element of repulsion onto to the bodies of black people.19 While it is just barely possible that
both of these statements might be true, the real causal work in Manganyi's argument is done
by 'the present cultural climate in Western societies' rather than by a specifically psychological
force.
16
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There would appear, then, to be every reason for South African historians to avoid the use of
psychological models, and even psychological terms, in constructing their interpretations of
the past. The precedents are hardly encouraging. What is more, both discourse and materialist
analysis, in addition to their other undoubted advantages, offer to make the use of psychology
unnecessary by explaining all the contents, - or at least all the socially relevant contents - of
individual minds in social terms. The offer to reduce individual psychology out of the picture
has been a very attractive one to make to historians. Historical research and explanation are
enormously complex. They require us to place what we aim to explain in so many contexts
that the opportunity to ignore a particularly awkward one - and to feel theoretically justified
in doing so - is hard to resist. 1 believe, nevertheless, that while approaches which seek to
explain the contents of individual minds by locating them in their social context remain vitally
necessary to historical understanding, they are not sufficient to the task.
Attempts to reduce psychology away don't work. It is simply implausible to argue that
individuals1 minds are entirely socially constructed. Marxist claims to this effect are not
logically coherent. Quite simply, the existence of false consciousness requires the existence of
true consciousness. If the consciousness of the members of a particular class arises, with
whatever degree of complexity, from their social position (their relation to the means of
production), then it cannot be that the consciousness of members of one particular class (the
proletariat when it has become a class-for-itself, by whatever means) also happens to be the
true consciousness of all humankind. But this is precisely what Marxism requires. Since the
proletariat as class-for-itself and the rest of humanity are biologically identical and since,
further, that it is possible for individuals to change their class position and their class
consciousness, the capacity of properly conscientised proletarians - and their leaders - to
possess true consciousness requires that there be an essential human nature and, therefore, an
essential human psychology. This essential psychology must underlie whatever ideological
mystifications exist in the minds of people in states of false consciousness. This difficulty is
not, it should be noted, one which applies only to earlier and simpler Marxist formulations.
Both Robert Miles' and Frederick Jameson's extremely sophisticated versions of late Marxism
are just as vulnerable to this line of argument as is Marx himself- who would not, in any case,
have denied that final goal of communist revolution was to free the real underlying human
essence from the multiple snares in which capitalism has trapped it.20
Discourse analysis of individual consciousness, which claims to show that the individual
psyche is 'constituted through the social domain of discourse' are not very much more
convincing than analogous Marxist claims.21 One of the many merits of the impeccably lucid
and fair-minded theoretical sections of Jonathan Potter and Margaret VJ QthereW s Mapping the
Language of Racism is that they make clear, and openly confront, the consequences of the
belief that every feature of the human world, including the human self, is constituted in
discourse. It is their contention that, 'Subjectivity is organized discursively as a public act of
self-presentation, but introspection, private accounting for oneself, is no less discursive.... A
sense of identity and subjectivity is constructed from the interpretative resources - the stories
and narratives of identity - which are available in our culture'.22 Although it is, of course, true
that individual identity is to a very large extent constructed from available cultural resources, it
is not thereby established - at least in the absence of very much more thorough and careful
philosophical argument - that the human self is entirely constituted by discourse. Wetherell and
Potter's claim does not begin to refute Descartes's well-worn but trusty cogito ergo sum. The
content of the cogito may very well be largely culturally determined, but to say the same of the
fact of the existence of the sum is to confuse the content of one variety of thought - thought
about objects, ideas, other people and so forth - with the contrasting variety of thought which
is explicitly self-aware: thoughts that imply or explicitly state that 'I exist.' It seems utterly
implausible that self-awareness is entirely the result of social conditioning. If this is admitted,
then the nature of the pre-existing human self must surely play some role in the way in which
people experience the social world.
20
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The time has more than come, however, for this historian's dangerously ill-informed and
amateur attempt to venture into the philosophical arena to cease. Even in the likely event of
the arguments offered in the preceding paragraphs for the irreducibility of the individual
psyche being refuted, it is still the case that historians, in their everyday empirical practice, are
continually confronted by the workings - or, minimally, what appear to be the workings - of
individual minds. As Peter Gay puts it,
The professional historian has always been a psychologist.... Whether he knows it or not. he
operates with a theory of human nature; he attributes motives, studies passions, analyses
irrationality... He discovers causes, and his discovery normally includes acts of the mind.23
Since this is undeniably the case, it would seem at least arguable that historians might benefit
from adopting a somewhat more theorised psychological vocabulary. Gloomy precedents,
current intellectual fashion and common sense combine, however, to warn against the
adoption of some new all-encompassing psychological 'grand narrative'. What is required,
rather, is to discover which psychological concepts historians are likely to find most consonant
with, and helpful to, the task of constructing empirical historical narrative and explanation. It
would also seem wise to search for useful concepts somewhat more widely than historians
have done in the past. Marriages between history and psychoanalysis have generally not been
happy. It therefore seems sensible to consider whether other psychological approaches have
not something to offer historians too.
The major alternative to psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology, has long since replaced the
former as the dominant approach among psychologists themselves. At least one of its
branches, social identity theory, seems capable of explaining important aspects of the
behaviour of humans in groups with considerable plausibility.24 Social identity theory starts
from the undoubtedly correct axiom - common to cognitive psychology in general - that the
mind's capacity to process information (in all forms, from sense impressions to complex ideas)
is considerably less than the quantity of information with which it is continuously presented.
The mind's unavoidable first task is to simplify. When this process is applied to the human
23
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realm, it obviously creates a strong tendency toward group identification and stereotyping,
both of oneself and of others. What is more, for social identity theorists,
... on the motivational front, individual sclf-cstccm begins to be linked to the fortunes of the
group as a whole... Since self-esteem is a desirable commodity, group members will be
motivated to maximise the differences between... groups in favour of Ihc ingroup and will
emphasise the positive distinclivcness of their own group on any dimensions which arc
valued such as prestige, monetary gains, ascription of intelligence and virtue, etc.25
For social identity theory, although this process does not operate in isolation from social
sources of conflict, 'conflict is sustained by the psychological consequences of group
membership which will operate willy nilly'. 26 Social identity theory is therefore very unlikely
to appeal to those who believe that the human world is entirely constituted in discourse or that
it arises Mn the last analysis' from the clash of material interests - though it is arguable that
there is no necessary contradiction between social identity theory and less optimistic or
totalising versions of these points of view. Naturally, it is also very important to guard against
racist appropriations of these ideas and to insist that though we may be 'hard-wired' for social
stereotyping, this is neither a desirable characteristic nor one which operates in isolation from
non-psychological sources of conflict. Humans are clannish and fractious creatures. There are
occasions when simply admitting that this is the case - and that there may very well be
biological reasons for it - will spare historians the difficulties and implausibilities which arise
from trying to explain all the features of some particular conflict in terms of external social
causation.
As this superficial discussion of one branch of cognitive psychology shows, some concepts
and findings derived from the mainstream of psychological thinking are certainly worth
historians' attention. Considered as a disciplinary whole, though, it does not recommend itself.
It has long been a gibe against psychoanalytic history that one cannot psychoanalyse the dead.
This is only partially true, but it is undoubtedly the case that one cannot pass among them
handing out sharp pencils and survey forms designed to elicit quantitative data. It has also to
be said that attempts by cognitive social psychologists to provide explanations for specific past
zi
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events and social structures are no less disappointing than those of their psychoanalytic
counterparts.27
If the wholesale adoption of psychoanalysis as scheme of understanding the social world has
led historians into absurdity, a total reliance on cognitive psychology threatens to lead into
banality, into an explanation of too much in the way of violence and oppressive power
relations by way of a rueful acceptance of'the way things just happen to be'. As Don Foster
points out, the contribution of psychology to social explanation ought ideally to take place at
several levels. These would include an acknowledgment of the role of cognitive psychology in
helping social scientists to understand the nature and limits of what is psychologically possible
in inter-personal and inter-group relations as well as the development of some formal method
of understanding the 'intra-psychic level' - the limits of possibility within an individual mind.28
Two models appear to compete to provide an model and a vocabulary within which to explain
the Mntra-psychic' features of minds. The dominant cognitive approach, as remarked above,
sees the human mind as a limited-capacity information processing system and people,
therefore, as 'naive scientists', seeking to explain their world in terms of a small sample of
faultily-perceived data.29 This model has received abundant experimental support and seems, in
its clarity and simplicity, far more attractive than the murky depths and multiple departments
of the Freudian schemas as they were developed in Freud's own work and those of his
disciples and apostates. Nevertheless, I believe that a Freud-influenced understanding of the
structure of the individual psyche is likely to be of much greater use to historians.30 The
21
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cognitive model suggests that the mind holds up an imperfect mirror to the social world, but
that the mirror's specific 'contents' are no more than a distortion of what it reflects. This
model, therefore, in turn reflects back almost the entire task of explaining the socially relevant
contents of the human psyche back into the realm of the social. This may be a prudent
procedure - but it offers historians only a little help in trying to understand the interaction
between the individual psyche and the social world.
The model of the psyche which Freud held during the middle phase of his life,31 by contrast,
claims to show us that the distorting mirror is, in fact, a piece of mirrored glass, a one-way (or
almost one-way) window, behind which is concealed a dark room, as in a TV cop-show.
Much of the contents of the mind are simply reflections of the social world - but the dark
room hidden behind the mirrored glass also contains important actors, whose views on the
drama played out on the mirrored side of the glass can be decisive. This dark room full of
sinisterly lurking cops, to drop this increasingly preposterous metaphor, is the unconscious. In
the unconscious lurks a non-rational, unflatteringly basic and emotionally very powerful
collection of instincts, wishes and fears, which co-exist in ways the conscious mind would
consider utterly contradictory: 'Freud, it must be emphasised, held not merely that
contradictory elements... can exist in the unconscious, but that they exist there without
contradiction'.32 The contents of the unconscious strongly influence the conscious part of the
mind in its emotions, thoughts and actions, however well-controlled or respectable the mind
may consciously think itself to be.
The Freudian model of mind provides historians with an elegant and plausible explanation for
the ways in which historical actors often seem to have been dominated by conflicting
"C. .continued)
mechanistic model of mental functioning he developed in his 1895 'Project for a Scientific Psychology'.
( R Wollheim, Sigmund Freud, (2"u ed.), New York: 1990, chapter 2) The same point has recently been made
in an excellent debate on psychoanalysis conducted in Prospect, and which is available at:
www.prospect-magazinc.co. uk/highlights/pills_talk/indcx. html
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perceptions and strong but ambivalent emotions. This fact causes considerable trouble for both
material and discourse analysis, both of which are required by it to postulate that ambivalent
people arc something like badly tuned radios, picking up broadcasts from more than one
station at a time. Ambivalence and self-contradiction are much more easily and plausibly
explained if the existence of a muddled and demanding unconscious is postulated.
This Freudian perspective also makes it possible to incorporate into historical analysis what
might be called the 'remainder' which is left after more socially-oriented forms of explanation
have done their work. The individual and collective subjects of historical enquiry frequently
display what appear to have been obsessive needs or extreme emotional responses to the
social circumstances. If they do not ignore this material, historians tend to argue that some
individual's intense hatreds or obsessive needs for deference, even when they have had a clear
causal influence on the course of historical events, are somehow not the province of historians
and should be referred to the unfathomable and ultimately unimportant discipline called
'individual psychology'. This is obviously unsatisfactory - and a limited application of
psychoanalytic technique by historians makes it unnecessary
The third advantage offered by the Freudian model of mind is both the least known to the
historical profession and, Z believe, the most important, providing the most useful forms of
assistance that psychology can offer to historians. Historians - and perhaps particularly
historians concerned with the social world of European colonialism - are, as I have tried to
suggest, continually confronted by examples of 'sleight of mind' A Freud-influenced image of
mental structure and functioning offers an attractively logical way of helping us to explain how
settlers' mental subterfuges were possible. As Gay expresses it, Freudians view the mind,
'much like a modern military dictatorship.... It employs battalions of censors to prevent
domestic news from leaking out, and border patrols to prevent hostile ideas from reaching,
and possibly subverting, its people.'"
This, surely, is a model of the mind with which historians will be familiar. We come across
evidence of the human capacity for stubborn and apparently effortless self-deception - for
33
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simply 'not noticing1 - every time we return to the archives. Its existence is repeatedly
corroborated in the reports submitted to legislatures by long-dead bureaucrats, in century-old
newspaper editorials and in obscure memoirs privately printed 'at the request of my children'.
If the mind does have this capacity for repression, then the 'normal oddities' - of which
Cohen and Bousfield's sense of being 'alone' are examples - seem much easier to understand.
The Freudian model is capable not just of explaining this capacity, but also of detecting its
effects and its limits - tasks much more difficult for forms of explanation that reduce the
psyche to insignificance. Freudian psychoanalysis claims that opportunities and techniques
exist which enable some of the contents of one's unconscious to become consciously known
both to oneself and to others. To continue Gay's 'military dictatorship' metaphor:
Yet often neither the censors nor the patrols have the wit, or the agility, to carry their
assignments through. At night especially, but also at unguarded moments during the day.
messages, disguised as dreams, slips of the tongue, or neurotic symptoms get out; and
perceptions, dressed in innocuous garb, get in. Both, however, pay a price for their intrepid
penetration of the energetically defended frontiers: they are gravely distorted, treacherously
translated, sometimes crippled beyond cure. At the very least, they arc heavily masked...
recognizable only... to the schooled and sensitive interpreter.M
Awareness of what is repressed returns when one's psychic guard is down, or when the
pressure from external forces - perceptions, ideas, experiences - is so great that it overwhelms
these defences and repression ceases to be possible. In this way, the Freudian model of mind
helps to explain both the frequent occurrence and the character of'sleights of mind.1 This
model accounts for their tenacity and for their incomplete, ambivalent, 'twilit' character. It
also predicts and explains the situations in which they are apt to break down. The Freudian
way of visualising the structure of the mind, in other words, gives historians the opportunity to
show why and how sleights of mind can be widespread and powerful and, yet, how attitude
change can and does occur. No other set of concepts seems to offer these advantages
simultaneously.
But, as the advertising voice-overs have it, there is more: Freudian psychoanalysis claims to
allow knowledge of one's unconscious processes and their contents, without one having
previously been aware of them, to other people - in particular, to trained psychoanalysts. At
this point, it might appear that only two choices are possible for historians; either to abandon
31
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this sub-field to professional psychoanalysts with historical interests or to become immersed -
like Peter Gay - in the doctrines of psychoanalysis oneself, Oedipus complex, will-to-death
and all. It must be admitted that either option appears more logical and more rigorous than
any proposed middle way. The discipline of history, however, is a notorious haven for
theoretical half-measures and middle ways. Few historians who have taken the 'linguistic turn'
follow their colleagues in other disciplines into complete idealism and relativism. Materialist
historians often adhere to the importance of class struggle and material determination in the
last instance, without feeling any compulsion, say, to detect progress towards the triumph of
the proletariat in their field of interest or even to uphold the labour theory of value.
Therefore, bearing in mind the dangerous allure and disputed value of many of the implements
within the Freudian toolbox and the unfortunate results of their wholesale adoption, it seems
wise to adopt only an extremely minimal set of Freudian concepts and techniques. I would
argue that these should be the notions of an unruly, incoherent and influential unconscious; of
the conscious or unconscious repression of perceptions, memories and ideas into the
unconscious when they conflict with conscious thoughts; and of the likelihood of the 'return
of the repressed' into the conscious mind in a modified, disguised form, as a 'compromise
formation* when, for whatever reason, the defences against the repressed material have been
relaxed or circumvented.35
In the normal course of events, repressed material returns to consciousness only in neurotic
symptoms, dreams, jokes and 'parapraxes' - that is, slips of the tongue, 'absent-minded
mistakes', instances of forgetting names which have hitherto been very well known, and the
like. Historians very rarely have access to the dreams of our subjects, and would normally be
exceptionally ill-advised to attempt to diagnose aspects of their behaviour as neurotic
symptoms. Jokes and parapraxes are more frequently encountered in the sources. While these
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are likely always to form the most useful point of entry to the unconscious for historians, it is
not necessary only to He in wait for them. The endlessly parodied technique of free-association
required of the patient as he or she squirms on the psychoanalyst's 'couch' is available, in a
modified form, to historians. Freud explained what was involved in the case of (allegedly)
therapeutic free-association;
If... derivatives [of what was primarily rcprcsscd| have become sufficiently far removed from
Ihc repressed representative, whether owing to the adoption of distortions or by reason of the
number of intermediate links inserted, they have free access to the conscious. It is as though
the resistance of the conscious against them was a function of their distance from what was
originally repressed. In carrying out the technique of psychoanalysis, we continually require
the patient to produce such derivatives for the repressed as, in consequence cither of their
remoteness or distortion, can pass the censorship of the conscious.... During this process we
observe that the patient can go on spinning a thread of such associations, till he is brought up
against some thought, the relation of which to what is repressed becomes so obvious that he
is compelled to repeat his attempt at repression.16
It should, therefore, be possible to read passages of argument or description with an eye to the
point at which the 'thread of associations' leading from some observation or remark abruptly
breaks off. This would involve, for instance, an attempt to be alert to sudden changes of
subject or to firm denials of the conclusion to which an argument had appeared to be leading.
Such a moment certainly seems to occur when Sub-Inspector Wilson's memoir shifts from a
resentful discussion of the alleged nature of Africans to a recollection of a pot-shot at a
leopard. What he says about Africans, among other things, is that they have 'nerve', but that
they are insolent, overbearing and dishonest. Despite this, he has been able to arrest and to
have convicted numerous Africans, including the two men mentioned on this occasion.
Africans are despicable and cunning - but he is winning the battle against them. The 'tiger', on
the other hand, while it has as much 'nerve' as African people, is also 'fine', 'noble7 and
'defiant' - and escapes 'scatheless' from the Sub-Inspector. In these post-Freudian times, it
seems almost cliched to point out that what has occurred is a 'displacement of affect' from
Africans to the leopard.37 What Wilson cannot consciously think about Africans - that they
appear to be resisting colonialism with considerable bravery and success and even, possibly,
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that this is something to be admired, can be shifted onto the 'compromise formation' - the
annoying, magnificent and invulnerable leopard. Even in the case of the apparently adamantine
Edward Wilson, then, the construction of an individual mind by colonial discourse had distinct
- and discernable - limits.
In most cases, of course, the opportunity to use Freudian techniques does not fall so easily
into one's lap. When examining the writing of more normally constituted people - and more
normal, less spectacular 'sleights of mind' - much more careful and subtle readings will be
required. Even in these cases, though, I believe that a tentative and judicious application of
psychoanalytic concepts and vocabulary will help historians to explain these kinds of attitudes
more lucidly and convincingly. Far from being unnecessary quackery to be avoided at all costs,
a little of Dr Freud's medicine can be very useful. To end on the sort of personal testimonial
appropriate to those selling patent cures: It has certainly helped me. These psychoanalytic
ideas seem to me to cast a great deal of light on the confident and thorough-going but
simultaneously insecure and desperately limited nature of British colonialism in South Africa.
Suggestions, refutations and reading-lists gratefully received at: 105sgd@muse.wits.ac.za
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